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Abstract 
 
There is ever-growing evidence, and importance of Financial Inclusion in economic growth and             
development in emerging economies like India. However, there is little-to-no information about            
the role of institutions engaged in digitized payments in accelerating Financial Inclusion. This             
paper aims to study the effects of the recent Demonetization ordinance, and its impact on               
Financial Inclusion in 2016, as well as the impact on recent institutional policy announcements.              
Additionally, It aims to assess the potential benefits of a digitized payment ecosystem and its               
institutional framework, in response to orders made by the Government of India and The Reserve               
Bank of India in order to achieve full financial inclusion in the long-run. 
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Introduction 
 
The Indian financial sector has undergone momentous structural changes from the onset            
of financial liberalization in the 90s. The period of liberalization became a crucial part in terms                
of structural adjustment as it attempted to improve economic reforms for the weaker sections in               
Indian society. The financial regulators of the country have been attempting to build an inclusive               
system that encourages economic growth, hoping it will translate to full financial inclusion.             
Furthermore, there has been an enormous generation of literature that established the positive             
impact of an efficient and extended financial sector on economic growth and development. India              
holds a consensus of financial inclusion taking priority, both from the government and public              
personnel, and has been striving to bring the entire currency under the radar of the law.  
On November 8, 2016 the Government of India announced the demonetization of high-currency             
notes in the banking system. It was viewed as ‘one of the most extreme monetary experiments in                 
recent history’ (Ghosh, Chandrasekhar, Patnaik, 2017). This had colossal effects on the            
economy, and caused distress especially on the lives of the rural population. More specifically,              
the unbanked. It immediately raised multiple concerns, related to its legality, ramifications and             
the experimental nature of the ordinance. Its initial goal was to eliminate ‘black money,’ the               
printing of ‘counterfeit notes’ and ‘terror financing’. A week after announcing the ordinance, the              
regulators changed the declared goal of Demonetization, of turning India into a ‘cashless             
society’. 
On a parallel track, India has been on the wave of inviting dynamic payment ecosystems in the                 
economy, given the rise of ‘fintech’ companies and increased smartphone subscription in the             
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nation. Digital payments have surged the economy in recent times, and assisted the             
Government’s initiatives to ‘formalise the informal’ through easier banking solutions.  
The objective of this study is to understand whether the unbanked in India, can facilitate               
payments in the formalised banking system, through the assimilation and intention of previous             
financial inclusion strategies, and whether the Demonetization ordinance was a mere impediment            
of the same. This paper is, at its essence, about Money & Banking.  
The Paper is organized as follows: 
Chapter One ​introduces the 2016 ‘legal tender charter’ and previous iterations of the             
demonetization ordinance, the purported logic of the same, the ‘Black economy,’ the growth of              
currency holdings in the Indian economy, to its inadequacy in 2016, and a critique of the                
announced decision. 
Chapter Two covers the role of banking in the Indian economy and the Government’s previous               
institutional policy initiatives which is indispensable in order to sufficiently understand the            
intent, and trajectory of financial liberalization in the Indian economy, after the industrial boom              
(under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh), that helped liberalize trade and commodity markets,            
leading to the advent of a Payments System.  
Chapter Three ​examines the current phase of financial inclusion in India’s policy objectives,             
new ideologies of financial inclusion, and the operations of the electronic payments ecosystem,             
with a focus on the challenges with adoption and barriers to entry. 
Chapter Four explores findings and perspectives on the current roadmap that the Government             
of India and RBI have created to ‘bank the unbanked. 
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Chapter One: Demonetization 
 
India has always been cash intensive, “even for a developing country”. (Mazzotta &             
Chakravorti, 2014, 5) It has a high ratio of currency in broad money (M1) and a low velocity of                   
cash. 87% of all transactions are cash-based. Cash still remains as the most 'readily available and                
widely used' method of payment in India. Regardless of being part of a formal banking system,                
Indians tend to carry cash (usually high denomination notes). “Most Indians lack the means to               
use cashless alternatives, irrespective of their desire to do so”. There has been slow growth in the                 
value of card payments, ‘despite a significant increase in the prevalence of financial cards and               
ATMs’. This Chapter will expand on the recent Demonetization initiative, that had an impact on               
the Indian economy. It will also expand upon the ‘Summary of Currency Holdings and High               
Cash Usage' in the Indian economy— that there was an overall increase in the money supply,                
causing the population to be inclined to use cash as a ‘store of value’. India's density of bank                  
facilities has grown since after bank nationalization and credit liberalization among the            
population . As of April 19, 2017, 283 million accounts were open under the PMJDY scheme,               1
after demonetization (PMJDY data). Although, after the ordinance, there was sparse activity            
after accounts were opened, due to a heavy reliance on cash had the population averse to                
adopting new methods of payment. “Too often we assume people resist moving away from cash               
because they fail to recognize the cost” (Mazzotta & Chakravorti, 2014, 35). This chapter              
expands upon the cost of currency operations from the supply-side (RBI & Commercial banks). 
 
1 See Chapter Two 
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1.1 Defining Demonetization 
Currency, in the form of banknotes issued by the Reserve Bank of India (issuing              
authority) is 'backed by the legal power invested' (Chandrasekhar, Ghosh, Patnaik, 2017, 8-10).             
Therefore, it is 'legal tender' wherein, the authority issuing it makes a 'promise to accept the note                 
at its face value'. The process of demonetization is the 'removal of that backing’--it is the process                 
by which particular currency notes are no longer legal tender. 
 
“All currency notes are promissory notes, explicitly or implicitly backed by the state. They              
contain the words ‘I promise to pay the bearer the sum of __” (Ghosh, Chandrasekhar and                
Patnaik, 2017). Hence, demonetization should not abandon this promise, i.e it should require the              
exchange of such notes to an ‘equal value’, in a form that is acceptable by the economy.  
 
1.1.1 The Three Iterations of Demonetization in the Indian Economy 
On November 8, 2016, the Prime Minister of India Mr. Narendra Modi announced to the               
country, the government’s decision to remove the ‘legal tender charter’ of INR 500 and INR               
1000 banknotes, and the currency ceased to be legal tender for four hours, after it had been                 
disclosed at 8:00 am, effective as of midnight. This was an opportunity for banks to invite high                 
and hasty deposits (within 72 hours after the announcement) which caused a high money supply               
in bank accounts of institutions (See Section 1.1.2). Banks opened their windows for the              
exchange of old notes in this 72 hour period. He also announced the issuance of new banknotes:                 
INR 500 and INR 2000. It was described as “a historic opportunity’ for the PM to siphon out the                   
evils in the country’s shadow economy (Dwivedi, Tamilmani, Rana et. al. 2016). The aim of the                
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government was to expose tax evaders, counterfeiters of money, hoarders of cash and corrupt              
personnel. The ‘increased incidence’ of fake notes in big denominations (RBI FAQs, 2016), were              
detected in the banking system (including notes seized by the authorities and enforcement             
agencies). The counterfeit notes made up for 0.002% of the notes in circulation. As per a Press                 
Release on Nov. 8, 2016 under the ‘Gazette notification’ (Ministry of Finance, 2016) “the stated               
objectives were to:  
(i) curb the menace of fake currency;  
(ii) wipe out unaccounted and tax evaded money stored in such high-value notes; and  
(iii) prevent use of high denomination notes for terror financing.”  
 
The first demonetization occurred in January 1946, when currency notes of denomination: INR             
1000, INR 5000, and INR 10,000 were removed from circulation. In 1946 (British Colonial              
India), after the Ten pound note was called in, Sir Archibald Rowlands , a Finance Member then,                2
imposed this action towards India as ‘one more concrete example for the Indian Government to               
follow in its fight against black market money and tax evasions which have now assumed               
enormous proportions’ (Simha, 1970, 76). The government went ahead with the decision to             
demonetize notes of the denomination value of Rupees 500 and above. Governor Trevor, stated              
that the Financial Member gave him the impression that the decision would go ahead, only on                
the ‘onset of an inflationary spiral’ (in a scheme drafted by Mr. Sundaresan, Agarwal 2016) .                
What appeared as a scheme to ‘get a hold of the tax evader’, directed towards black-marketing,                
the role of demonetization in 1946 served as a ‘minatory and punitive gesture' according to Sir                
2See “​Rowlands, Sir Archibald (1892–1953),” B. R. Tomlinson in ​Oxford Dictionary of National Biography​, eee ed.                
H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. David Cannadine, January 2011,                 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35852 (accessed  April 23, 2017). 
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Chintaman (An Indian Civil Servant) in a lecture delivered in February 1957 in Bombay. A               
correspondent in the Economic and Political Weekly Journal on May 13, 1967, questioned: What              
exactly will demonetization achieve ? He then proceeded to argue that “only a small proportion               
of hidden wealth at any point is likely to be held in the form of currency notes” . Currency as we                    3
know can also be the channel to continuously finance bogus transactions as it possesses a nature                
of convertibility to multiple forms of assets such as real estate and gold. 
The following iteration of demonetization was in 1978, when the President of India ‘promulgated              
high denomination banknotes’ on January 16, 1978, and then demonetized notes of INR 1000,              
INR 5000 and INR 10,000 with the objective in mind to eliminate “the possible use of such notes                  
for financing illegal transactions”. These notes were of high value, and the promulgation of the               
1978 demonetization had ‘little effect on the daily lives of people’ (Rajakumar and Shetty 2016,               
13). Since these notes were of little use to common people, at that time, there was little attention                  
given to the change. High denomination notes at the time constituted around 0.6% of the total                
currency in circulation. The total demonetized amount was INR 731 million (INR ​73,100,000)             
The purpose of this demonetization ordinance was presented in the preamble as:  
 
“The availability of high denomination bank notes facilitates the illicit transfer of money for              
financing transactions which are harmful to the national economy or which are for illegal              
purposes and it is therefore necessary in the public interest to de- monetize high denomination               
notes.” ​ (Preamble to the High Denomination Bank Notes Act of March, 1978, RBI) 
3  (1967). Demonetisation and “Black” Money. ​Economic and Political Weekly​.  
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The authorities in 1978, noticed ‘quantum jumps’ in currency holdings (Table 1, Rajakumar and              
Shetty, 2016, 14). Only ₹100 notes (highest denomination then) in circulation attempted to meet              
the RBI’s view of ‘meeting higher transaction needs, arising from inflation’ (Rajakumar &             
Shetty 2016, 13). The ordinance issued did not succeed, because ‘out of a total issue of INR                 
1439.7 million of the high denomination notes, notes of the value of INR 1349 million were                
exchanged’ (History of the Reserve Bank of India 1970, 708). ’45% of high-denomination notes              
in circulation or 53% of high denomination notes’, were in the vaults of banks and the form of                  
government treasuries. In the most recent demonetization bill that was passed in 2016, about              
86% of such currency was with the public in higher denomination. “The underlying common              
theme for the two episodes of demonetization in independent India is the respective             
government’s effort to curb the menace of black money” (Nag 2016, 18). Other differences from               
the earlier ordinances (1946 and 1978) from the 2016 one were that the size of the cash economy                  
was larger in 2016. The previous ordinance did not impact the poor, as they were in possession                 
of smaller denominations.  
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1.1.2 Summary of Currency Holdings and High Cash Usage (up to 2016 ‘DeMo’ Ordinance) 
The dominance of cash in the country through the years, and the considerable changes in               
currency holdings, have absorbed higher amounts of currency from the banking system (after             
large foreign capital investments post financial liberalisation). In 2012, 87% of all cash             
transactions were cash-based . This fueled the impetus to hold large amounts of cash. Since              4
2001-02, post the 1978 ‘DeMo’, there was outstanding diversification ‘in favor of the services              
sector’ (Rajakumar and Shetty 2016, 14). The liberal economic environment, especially in the             
commodity trading sector, followed through to high supply and inflation in the economic system,              
and also brought down the value of the rupee. The response to this was ‘reintroducing high                
denomination notes for ease of trade and general economic activity’ by the authorities             
(Rajakumar and Shetty 2016, 15). Thus, this has altered the way in which money supply behaves                
in the Indian economy.  
In India, ​M1 (narrow money) refers to the currency available to the public, demand              
deposits and other Reserve Bank deposits, and ​M3 (broad money) consists of time deposits. The               
focus has been on the M1 component. Within M1, the currency held by the public is primary.                 
The ratio of currency with the public to M3 has seen decline over the years (except 2014-15).                 
The variation of M1 was higher than that of M3 because of slow growth in demand deposits (See                  
Figure 1). In the expansion of M3, the share of M1 doubled in 2013-14 from 14.4% to 28.8% in                   
2015-16 (Rajakumar & Shetty 2016, 15). During this period, inching towards the 2016             
demonetization bill, there was a lot of liquidity generated, which was attributed to the increase in                
money supply, and subsequently, the amount of cash deposits in the banking system grew              
4 Mazzotta & Chakravorti (2014, 11) 
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beyond the government’s anticipation. This is in line with the public’s use of higher              
denomination notes, in two years, especially from 2013-16 (See Figure 1). They became more              
inclined towards using money as a store of value, as people did not view the eroding possibility                 
of the currency. Apart from money being a medium of exchange, in this case, people “increased                
their propensity to view currency as a store of value” (Rajakumar & Shetty 2016, 16). Moreover,                
a prevalent case for women in low income areas, is to save in the form of cash, away from the                    
eyes of men in the house (Sharma, 2016). 
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Figure 1: Movements in Money Supply and its Components  (Source: Rajakumar & Shetty 2016, 
Based on data extracted from Reserve Bank of India, ​Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 
2015-16 ​) 
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With one stroke of a pen, on November 8, 2016, the highest currency notes: ₹500 and                
₹1000 were de-recognized. The aim, for the final iteration was to combat tax frauds, printing of                
counterfeit notes and corruption: the same three reasons as the previous iterations. In the Prime               
Minister’s televised speech, he made apparent the goal of the act: “curbing financing of terrorism               
through the proceeds of Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN) and use of such funds for               
subversive activities such as espionage, smuggling of arms, drugs and other contrabands in India,              
and for eliminating Black Money which casts a long shadow of a parallel economy on our real                 
economy” (Ministry of Finance Press Release, 2016). One day after the ordinance, the old              
demonetized notes were up for exchange in banks and post offices, with ‘proper identification’,              
to then receive new ₹500 and ₹2000 notes. This was implemented without a deposit limit until                
December 30, 2016.  
Limits to deposit were then increased to only ₹4500 from November 14, 2016 till              
December 30, 2016. Cash withdrawals from current accounts (equivalent to checking accounts in             
the United States) had a limit of INR 10,000 per day and INR 20,000 per week (Ghosh,                 
Chandrasekhar et. al. 2017, 9). If an individual accounted for more than INR 250,000, the               
deposits would be matched with parallel income tax returns (this was enforced as a warning),               
after which a new scheme titled: ‘Taxation and Investment Regime’ was imposed: an             
opportunity for black money operators to come out clean, at a certain cost (a heavy penalty on                 
black money deposited: tax rate of 50% with 25% invested for four years in an interest free                 
deposit scheme ). These severe measures taken were performed in an environment where high             5
dependency on cash transactions exists. The wealthy (and the criminals) who came forward             
5 Lahiri (2016,3) 
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would receive the initial 25% after four years, after it has been accounted for. Hence, this move                 
not only impaired people’s daily convenience, but also all economic activity. 
 
1.2 Claimed Goals and Assumptions of Demonetization 
The first integral assumption made by the government was that the two demonetized             
notes (INR 500 and 1000 or 'high value notes') were of use to the illicit economy. The second                  
assumption was that the two notes were not likely to be used by ordinary people. In fact, it                  
directly affected a large amount of people who have nothing to do with the black economy.                
Hence, it was of belief that the ordinance would impact 'hoarders of cash' and that there would be                  
some 'temporary inconvenience' to individuals who ethically pay their taxes. Moreover, Finance            
Minister Arun Jaitley said: "The goal of this is to clean transactions, (to) clean money" . The                6
second claim/assumption was that the black economy consists of 'stocks of wealth, rather than of               
flows '(Chandrasekhar, Ghosh, et. al. 2014, 22). This refers to the unaccounted or             
'under-reported' activity to tax authorities, and that majority of this stock was either hid in places,                
or ‘stashed away’. The purported logic behind this was to reduce the incentive to generate and                
hoard black money. The third premise was that this procedure would stop the printing of               
counterfeit currency. The final argument that received the most attention, was that the proposed              
goal of ‘DeMo’ shifted within a month, towards the digitalization of the economy. This change is                
explored later in the chapter, under the critique of Demonetization. 
 
 
6 News, India Business, comp. "Demonetization: How It Will Empower the Franchise Industry."The Times of India                
[Delhi] 9 Dec. 2016: n. pag. Print. 
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Figure 2: 2016 Demonetization Conversion Table (Source: Figures for INR 500 and INR 1000 
from RBI Annual Report 2015-16 Table VIII.1,, arranged by Ashok Lahiri, 2016, 89) 
The figure above is data from the 2015-16 RBI Annual Report, with assumptions made              
by Lahiri. He writes:  
“If a uniform 15 per cent of such notes do not come back for circulation because of the                  
anti-blackmoney measures, then only 14.1 billion of INR 500 notes and 5.5 billion of INR 1000                
will be deposited into accounts or presented for conversion into other notes. A more aggressive               
assumption of 20 per cent of such notes not coming back yields 13.3 billion INR 500 notes and                  
5.2 billion of INR 1000 notes for conversion into either legal tender cash or deposits” (Lahiri                
2016). 
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Interestingly enough, his data arrangement is in line with RBI Annual Report 2015-16             7
indicating that the return of currency notes to RBI between November 10 and December 10,               
2016 was worth: 12.4 billion of old INR 500 and 1000 notes. This is approached by Mr. Lahiri as                   
a consistent calculation and he points out that “it is not clear as to how much cash deposited will                   
turn out to be unaccounted and subject to the provisions of the taxation laws” (Lahiri, 2017, 8).                 
However, the RBI is yet to ‘present an estimate of how much of counterfeit currency that had                 
been in circulation had been neutralised by demonetization’.(Reddy 2017, location 2506) 
 
Notes & GDP 
Figure 3 is a conversion of notes to % of GDP where the GDP is at ‘current and market price’  
(Reddy 2017, location 1318). C.R Reddy (2017) argues that the year-on-year increase is of              
varying magnitudes. He thinks there is no unusual pattern. However, my argument suggests that              
high denomination notes are rising faster than all of the banknotes that are in circulation, and the                 
reason for this is the growth in bank credit, and the concomitant access to banking infrastructure                
regionally.  
 
 
7 Annual Report (pp. 88-89, Rep. No. 2015-16). (2016). New Delhi: Reserve Bank Of India. 
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Figure 3: Notes and GDP (Source: Based on data extracted from the RBI [2016a], Handbook of 
Statistics on Indian Economy 2015-2016) 
 
“The RBI’s decision to support the note ban and its flawed implementation have exacted              
a price from the economy in general but the poor in particular” . India’s GDP was maintained at                  8
7.6% when the ordinance was announced, although the lasting effects on private consumption             
are currently projected to slow GDP growth and fall to 6% in Q3 of 2017, but eventually rebound                  
to 7.2% in FY 2017-18 (IMF data). Although, the level of hardship that was faced by Indian                 9
8 Balakrishnan, P. (2016, December 14). The Poor Are Paying for Demonetization. The Wire. Foundation for                
Independent Journalism  Retrieved March, 2017 
9PTI. (2017, February 22). Demonetisation to pull down India’s GDP by 1%: IMF. The Hindu. Retrieved March 20,                  
2017. 
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citizens, especially those who conducted daily transactions in cash, affecting private           
consumption still has its looming effects. Arjun Jayadev, a Senior Economist at the Institute for               
New Economic Thinking explains—“The widespread pain caused to those who are not its             
intended targets is a good reason to oppose such indiscriminate policy actions” (Jayadev, 2016).              
However, one can take away that demonetization was a long narrative that was bound to be                
accepted by those who were ‘unjustly injured’ ( ​ibid.) by it, and it proves the manner in which it                  
was aggressively imposed. The preamble on the Reserve Bank’s website states: “To regulate the              
issue of Bank Notes to generally operate the currency and credit system of the country to its                 
advantage”. (Reserve Bank of India Preamble, 1934) This recent action left individuals confused,             
as this mission statement was clearly not upheld. Kumar (2017, 1) implies and emphasizes the               
situation that “majority of wage payments are made in cash form”. Moreover, 96% of total               
transactions in retail markets are in cash-form (Confederation of All India Traders Study). There              
was a significant change in labor market dynamics as the ordinance left the employment status of                
millions of informal labor workers, uncertain. Though the informal working class received a big              
blow, poor, ordinary individuals feared the unfavorable effects of a cash shortage. Additionally,             
The Agriculture Produce Market Committee (APMC) in Gujarat (cash-heavy business), reported           
only 10% of usual business being conducted , and were forced to close the business for a couple                 10
of days, before transitioning into RTGS digitized payments (See 3.2).  
 
 
 
10TNN. (2016, November 18). Not business as usual at APMCs across Gujarat. The Times Of India. Retrieved                 
March, 2017. 
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1.3 Inadequacy of Cash in the Banking System  
An even higher denomination of INR 2000 was introduced after the INR 1000 and 500 were                
called back. On March 31, 2016, “out of the INR 16.6 trillion cash in circulation, the value of                  
INR 500 and INR 1000 notes in circulation was INR 14.2 trillion” (Lahiri 2016, 5). The slow                 
rate of printing new money, and the availability of new notes added to the shortage of                
replacement currency (Ghosh, Chandrasekhar, et. al. 2017, 10), and had the Indian economy run              
into multiple disruptions, like the time lag between processing old notes and replacing them with               
new notes.  
The economy has always consisted of two types of cash: accounted and unaccounted.             
Cash is only legal when it is accounted either as a tax or in the bank’s current account, under the                    
radar of the RBI and the Government. The cash that is outside of these accounts is either                 
unaccounted or ‘black’. A Cash shortage is usually a common occurrence when current and              
savings accounts of banks are not freely convertible into 'cash at par' (Lahiri 2017, 4). A shortage                 
rises with a 'suspension of this convertibility'. Demonetization posed restrictions on           
over-the-counter (OTC) cash withdrawals, where only INR 10,000 (subject to an overall limit of              
INR 20,000) a week could be withdrawn. Daily cash withdrawals from ATMs had restrictions of               
INR 2,000 per bank account, which was later raised to INR 2500 and then INR 4,500 .  11
Cash shortage was a new experience for a cash-hungry country like India, and with              
regard to to the withdrawal restrictions, there were long queues of individuals either depositing              
old notes for new notes in return, outside banks, around the country. Individuals were even               
compared to 'soldiers standing in the frontline of combat'. PM Modi, in his speech used the                
11 ET Bureau. (2016, December 31). RBI relaxes ATM withdrawal limit to Rs 4500 from Rs 2500 per day.. The                    
Economic Times. Retrieved February, 2017 
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phrase 'black money' 18 times and mentioned the other goal of 'DeMo' as the eradication of terror                 
financing. Ghosh, Chandrasekhar and Patnaik call this a 'hortatory device' that was used to              
'mobilize and convince ordinary people of the soundness and desirability of this move' (Ghosh,              
Chandrasekhar 2017, 12). 
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1.4 Cash Perspectives in India and Cost of Cash (Individual and Government level) 
Before addressing the cost of handling cash by the government, it is important to address               
the fact that the recent government bill wreaked havoc in the rural communities. "Rural Indians               
often have to travel a long way to reach a bank, and an estimated 300 million people don't have                   
the official ID that is required to process a cash exchange" . There was a certain cost incurred by                  12
the rural community upon the overnight disappearance of cash, as the monthly cash fees of those                
that possessed bank accounts, was lesser than that of the unbanked population (Mazzotta &              
Chakravorti 2016, 26). The Market Research Society of India uses the SEC classification             
(Demographic data ratified by the Market Research Society of India (MRSI) to classify             
households in India ) based on socioeconomic class. Figure 4 shows the fees of cash access in a                 13
month, against the level of socioeconomic class (A1 to D2). We see that the self employed                
professional (D2), who is unbanked, has to bear more costs of accessing cash. Figure 4 is                
discussed in detail in Chapter Four: Discussion and Conclusion. 
12Shah, H. (2016, November 28). India Wants a Cashless Society. But There’s a High Cost. Slate Newspaper.                 
Retrieved March 4, 2017. 
13Gupta, P. (2005, September 9). Socio-economic Classification - Are we (in) SEC C? [Web log post]. Retrieved                 
April 30, 2017, from https://readbetweentheps.blogspot.com/2005/09/socio-economic-classification-are-we.html 
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Figure 4: Cash Fees by Wealth and Financial Access, data from the ​ Market Research Society of 
India ​classification (Source: Mazzotta & Chakravorti 2014, 25 ) 
 
The RBI’s main function is to manage currency. “With respect to security of cash,              
guidelines regarding cash management operations are issued to the currency chest and branches”.             
(Mazzotta & Chakravorti, 2014, 49). There are multiple reasons as to why India pays a hefty                
price for handling its payments. The first reason is having to reissue new currency after a course                 
of poor handling—“low value notes have to be replaced in less than a year” (Mazzotta &                
Chakravorti 2014, 49) . The Institute for Business in the Global Context of Tufts University               
sheds light on the costs of currency operations in India, based on the works of Kleine,                
Krautbauer and Weller (2013). They discuss the RBI’s cost incurrence from ‘printing currency,             
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undertaking forward transport from manufacturing facility to issue department, and reverse           
transport of soiled notes’. The Reserve Bank and other commercial banks in the country spent               
around INR 210 million annually in currency operations (See Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 5: Cost of Currency Operations in India: ​units in Crores ​ (Source: RBI Annual Report 
2015-16) 
Commercial banks earn a certain fee from cash operations, but they incur expenses for              
‘cash handling, processing costs, insurance cost, payments for cash in transit companies, and             
losses on interest for standing amounts in branch and ATM’. (Mazzotta & Chakravorti 2014, 51).  
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In the next section, we will discuss the size of the illicit economy, and the impact of                 
demonetization on eradicating illegal financing and unaccounted activity, in order to conclude            
with a critique on the 2016 ordinance, and whether the erratic policy change of a ‘cashless                
society’ was of high priority, masked with the masses’ belief of wiping out black money.  
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1.5 The Black Economy: Effects on Banking and Financial Inclusion Development 
"Corruption pervades all spheres of economics activity in India, so much so that it can be                
regarded as an institution itself”- ​ (Benu Varman-Schneider, 82) 
The manner in which currency holdings have risen through all three iterations of             
Demonetization forced the RBI to construct objectives, so as to scrutinize the ‘black economy’,              
and ‘eliminate the possible use of such notes for financing illegal transactions’ from 1978 to               
now. 'The White paper' , according to C.R Reddy (2017) is the most 'comprehensive summary'              14
of different estimates of black money. In India, black money makes for bad policy. It is the                 
informal economy, ‘that constitutes 50% of the Indian economy, employing 93% of the             
workforce’ (National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector data). Sarkar (2010)            
explains, "black income has been causing underestimation of GDP in India as an enormous              
volume of income is diverted to this unaccounted sector resulting in growing continuation of              
parallel economy of the country" (Sarkar, 2010, 129). 'The amount of currency which the              
government hoped to disable in the black economy' through the Demonetization ordinance was             
between INR 3-4 trillion (2-3% of the GDP). This was argued by multiple analysts as a                
‘minuscule fraction' of the economy. Ghosh, Chandrasekhar and Patnaik (2017) argue that this             
was only a small portion that would have been captured by the move. However, a statistic made                 
by the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) on the incidence of black money                
in India (which was submitted in December 2013 but has still not been made public or even                 
submitted in Parliament)is reported to have suggested that the black economy amounts to as              
much as 75 per cent of recorded GDP .  15
14Jagota, M. (2012, May 21). Seven Things You Should Know About the White Paper on Black Money. The Wall                   
Street Journal. Retrieved November, 2016. 
15Mehra, P. (2014, August 4). Black economy now amounts to 75% of GDP. The Hindu. Retrieved February, 2017. 
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Cash as a medium of exchange in the black economy, is performed in various ways:  
1) Bribes (small to medium sized), that are unreported by tax authorities, that are conducted               
using cash. 
2) Transactions with the external market are done through cross-border transfers. 
3) Transactions in the 'hawala exchange market' , are likely to be in cash. (Reddy, 2017, location                16
959) 
As mentioned earlier, the main function of the Reserve Bank of India, is currency              
management. The banking system, according to concrete guidelines set by the RBI is in close               
relation to how assets are allocated efficiently. The Bank, in its normality, operates currency              
chests, and accepts deposits. However, the accommodation of the banking system was stretched,             
after demonetization. Certain operations for banks included transmitting the 'used and           
surrendered notes' back to the RBI, to then receive new notes. In this scenario, there was a time                  
lag between the 'surrender' of old and the release of new printed currency.As a result, banks were                 
not able to 'discharge their normal obligation of withdrawals of deposits made' (Reddy 2017).              
The bankers faced the wrath of their customers, who were queued up outside banks for numerous                
days, and became 'increasingly restive' for not being able to receive the money they had               
deposited (Ghosh, Chandrasekhar et. al 2017). The biggest failure for the banking system was              
the lack of spread in Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) because of the slow response and               
withdrawal assurance, within constraints posed by the RBI. Plus, it took 60 days for all ATMs in                 
both urban and rural sectors to be re-calibrated, causing further delays. 
16 a system or agency for transferring money traditionally used in the Muslim world, whereby the money is paid to                    
an agent who then instructs a remote associate to pay the final recipient. 
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As for meeting the declared goal of capturing black money in 2016, there was associated               
hardship faced by poor individuals, due to the nudge in financial governance. The corrupt and               
wealthy were able to beat the consequences due to the loopholes in the system, by attempting to                 
convert their unaccounted wealth, when previous notifications about the demonetization          
ordinance was announced.  
 
"Unfortunately, the long-drawn out process of the legal system, including the time taken to              
deliver final judgements, dampens the determination of people who would like to see             
anti-corruption laws implemented." ​ (Catching the Corrupt, EPW Journal Editorials, 2017) 
 
The currency shortage forced the population to turn to the banking system, during its              
surge in operations, for deposit and withdrawal actions, although many banks were unable to              
open new accounts due to the pressure on bank personnel from existing customers.  
The long-drawn out process of the legal system toward corruption reflects the inability of the               
lower sections of society from being able to access the formal financial system, arguing against               
erratic policy changes by the RBI. In public dialogue, the theme of ‘formalization of the               
informal’ made its emergence after the 2016 ordinance. “Demonetization and then digitization of             
monetary transactions would compel, it was argued, the informal sector to be economic agents              
into the formal sector and lead to greater tax compliance” . Chapter 3 will introduce the               17
aforementioned ‘formal sector’ ‘Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana’ scheme or the Prime            
Minister’s Financial Inclusion Programme where the Financial Technology (Fintech) service in           
17 Book Review. (2017, March 20). An extract from 'Demonetisation and Black Money' The Hindu. Retrieved                
March 22, 2017 
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India has been fused with a telecom revolution, to bring in all economic agents into the                
formalized sector. 
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1.6 Critique of the 2016 Demonetization 
Since there is ever-growing, but sparse development literature and macro-economic          
analyses related to this topic (as these developments are contemporary), I have prepared some              
concluding remarks. What was initially projected as a convenient policy to uproot black money,              
delivered a third variation of the failure, after the past two ordinances. Many termed this act, as a                  
‘financial emergency’, by virtue of a single ‘masterstroke’, resulting in 86% of the currency              
being swept. Interestingly, during mid-November, the policy focus shifted again. In the Reserve             
Bank's 'Frequently Asked Questions' (RBI FAQs) page on Demonetization, there were a set of              
revised goals that completely disregarded the former goal of driving away black money from the               
economy. By late November, it was clear and evident that the economy was far from eliminating                
terror financing and black money. The final argument made by the government, was based on the                
outlook that India would abandon cash based transactions to shift to an electronic and digitized               
manner of payments, phrased by PM Modi as 'a cashless society' to enable a 'rule-based formal                
sector' (Ghosh, Chandrasekhar, et. al. 2017, 23) which would benefit an efficient tax collection              
system. 'More importantly, the impact of demonetization on black money is almost nil' (Patnaik              
2017). Although I believe that the ordinance was a meaningless exercise, I argue that it was a                 
transition of cash exclusion from the society, but with a belief of slow rebuilding and inclusion.                
Additionally, Demonetization shrunk demand through the money supply, as there was a gigantic             
shock on both the production and consumption of goods in ‘predominantly cash-based’ rural             
India. There are ever-growing arguments by many economists about the failure of            
Demonetization, how it was unsuccessful in attempting to meet its declared goals, and the              
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manner in which it caused a significant amount of damage to the rights of the Indian population,                 
and to the Indian economy. 
First, ‘secrecy was given paramount importance’ during the planning and coordination of            
the bill (Reddy 2017, location 1255). This automatically led to ‘administrative difficulties’ in the              
process. Additionally, it led to the time lag as ATMs had to be re-calibrated, in order to dispense                  
new notes.. Second, the goal to formalize the informal economy, and drive away black money               
failed because the percentage of illicit wealth held in cash is as low as 6% of the country’s GDP.                   
Jindal Global University’s executive Vice dean quotes: “This intervention is a one-time draining             
of this current stock of black money but unless the root causes of corruption are removed,                
corruption will continue. It is sort of like a dialysis, more of a short term cleaning up than a                   
solution of the problem. It needs to be repeated periodically.” Professor C.R Reddy offers an               18
argument against demonetization in accordance with its implementation, and how an alternative            
way of acting upon illicit wealth would have been to ‘follow up on information on large cash                 
withdrawals from banks, and thereby identify possible flows of unaccounted cash.”   19
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Demonetization in India: Who Will Pay the Price?. Knowledge@Wharton(2016, November 16). Retrieved             
February 2017. 
19Reddy, C. R. (2017, April 2). With Demonetisation 2016 yet to deliver clear-cut benefits, what next? Scroll.in. 
Book Excerpt Retrieved April 3, 2017 
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1.6.1 Financial Exclusion in light of Demonetization 
‘Financial exclusion’ after the Demonetization bill, apparently undermined the ‘special          
efforts’ at financial inclusion that had been prepared by the government (PMJDY in 2014).              20 21
Kumar & Kumar (2016), state that Demonetization was a ‘blessing in disguise’. They argue that               
it ‘resulted in rapid banking education to the vast multitude of the unbanked and semi-banked               
population’. However, they completely disregarded:  
1) The fact that a new government initiative (PMDJY bank accounts, ​see Chapter Three​)             
was ‘misused’ after demonetization and; 
2) The poor, who had been ‘enticed into opening bank accounts’, were prevented from             
accessing their own cash, holding the argument that the new financial instruments were             
treated in a ‘discriminatory way’. 
‘Small doses’ of the demonetized notes were deposited (as unaccounted wealth ) in the             22
PMJDY accounts. According to the government, there were ‘relatively large deposits’ in few             
PMJDY accounts, rendering the act as a ‘misuse’ by the financial regulators of the country.               
Ultimately, the ‘total increase in balances in Jan Dhan accounts post-demonetization came only             
to INR 4152.3 million, (45 days after) less than 3 per cent of the value of the returned notes’                   
(Chandrasekhar, Ghosh et. al. 2017, 51-53). The ‘misuse’ was not a widespread one, since it               
amounted to a small fraction of the total value of notes that were demonetized. However, this                
was not alarming. The deposit ceiling of the Jan Dhan account is INR 50,000 (no account holder                 
of the Jan Dhan could have deposited more than INR 49,000). Ghosh, Chandrasekhar and              
Patnaik (2017) provide an example of this. If the total income of a poor household is INR 7,000                  
20Ghosh, Chandrasekhar & Patnaik 2017,49-51 
21 This section is easier to understand after referring to Section 3.1.1 in Chapter 3 
22 There are a total of 258 million Jan Dhan accounts in India, as of 2016: DeMo Decoded (check) 
 
  
       30  
per month (below poverty line), it is not an amount to be held by a poor household for                  
‘precautionary or store of value’ benefits, especially in a ‘cash-dependent economy’. As we are              
aware, demonetization had ‘substantially increased deposits of old currency notes’, in spite of             
numerous restrictions enforced. Economists argue that “there were still many who did not hold              
accounts in the banking system, and had to use their relatives and friends to exchange their ‘old                 
notes’ in a perfectly honest way” (Chandrasekhar, Ghosh et. al. 2017, 51-53).  
The RBI’s manner of responding to the colossal deposits in ‘few accounts’ post-DeMo             
was to restrict the withdrawal value to INR 10,000 (for KYC -compliant customers) and INR              23
5,000 (for non-KYC compliant customers), denying the poor account holders, from accessing            
their own cash. This was an act of exclusion by the RBI, and ‘a reversal of the policy of using the                     
Jan Dhan accounts as instruments of financial inclusion’. Arguably, the ‘down-trodden’ were            
forced to conform to this 'poorly shaped policy', as they had little-to-nothing to do with               
counterfeit currency or illicit wealth, and were ‘made to pay (by denying them access to their                
own money)’. As for the black money operators, I agree with Patnaik’s statement: 
 
“The return of virtually the entire demonetized currency to banks is indicative both of the fact                
that the supposition of there being large cash-holding in the black economy was wrong, and also                
of the fact that black economy operators are always capable of taking steps to evade any                
measure, while it is the poor working people who become its victims”. ​(Patnaik 2017) 
 
 
23 KYC or ‘Know Your Client’ rules require proof of address and other documentation provided by the account                  
holder to be confirmed by banks (Chandrasekhar, Ghosh & Patnaik 2017, 51-53) 
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The evasive measures that black money operators took, only led to its ‘proliferation’, while the               
goal of Demonetization was to curtail it. 
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1.7 Concluding Remarks 
Every bill payment or fee is mostly paid in cash. “Among the 22% of adults who have to                  
pay school fees, 99% paid in cash (6% reported of using a bank account as well). Among the                  
19% of adults (15+) who received wages in the past year, 86% received wages in cash”                
(Larquemin, 2015, 4) 
Did the Indian economy, and especially the poor have to be shaken with the              
demonetization act, to drive the economy towards digitization? The process of forging an             
efficient path towards digitalization of the payments economy and prospects in financial            
inclusion initiatives, have been the biggest agenda for the financial regulators and the             
Government since 2014. There have been sizable improvements and progress between private            
companies and the ‘organized sector’ and those in the population who have accepted             
electronic/online methods of payment .  24
The numerical adoption of digitized payments is discussed in Chapter 3. It will also cover               
the effects of the roll-out of government regulated bank-tech-led inclusion models (Aadhaar,            
PMJDY—FinTech duo). It is still the fact that the larger, underbanked/unbanked population, is             
still outside the scope of the digital payments society, and its growth is based on user base and                  
acceptance. Before expanding on the operations of RBI’s current financial inclusion efforts,            
readers should be familiar with the origins of India’s payments system and the route of financial                
inclusion policies, from bank nationalization in 1969, to the onset of financial liberalization in              
1991, to its digitization in 2016 in order to understand and evaluate policy changes toward full                
inclusion and be able to answer the bigger question: Can we bank the unbanked given the current                 
24 Reddy, C. R. (2017, April 2). With Demonetisation 2016 yet to deliver clear-cut benefits, what next? Scroll.in.                  
Book Excerpt Retrieved April 3, 2017 
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circumstances? Chapter Two is an overview of the role of banking in the development of the                
economy, past financial inclusion policies in India, the system inversion (credit markets become             
more inclusive) and its governance. 
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Chapter Two: Banking Sector Growth and Reforms 
 
“Financial governance is the process of interaction and decision-making among the           
actors involved in a collective problem that led to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction of               
norms and institutions” (Joshi, 2016). Good governance has always been a prerequisite to             
Financial Inclusion policy in India. It leads to an improvement in delivery services and the               
overall welfare of the financial consumer associated. An ever-growing literature shows that            
financial inclusion has a significant positive effect for individuals, and multiple studies have             
been able to prove that the lack of financial access leads to poverty traps and income inequality                 
(Kunt and Levine, 2008). In 2015, The International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a report,              
noting that bolstering financial sector health and further financial inclusion would support            
growth going forward . This chapter is an assessment of government interventions favoring past             25
financial inclusion initiatives, and their impact on the access to banks by the poor. Rural credit                
markets have shown patterns of indebtedness, due to its ‘increasing informalization’ in            26
dispersed locations. In addition, this chapter also introduces the current infrastructure, under the             
regimes set by the National Payments Corporation of India and the Reserve Bank of India. 
 
 
 
 
 
25IMF Survey. (2015, March 11). IMF NEWS. Retrieved April 01, 2017 
26 (Bose, 2005, 6), Sukanya Bose’s evidence from book under financial indebtedness: Financial Liberalization and               
Rural Credit in India by V.K Ramachandran and Madhura Swaminathan 
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2.1 Role of Banking in Economic Development in India 
In Contemporary India, formal credit sources like commercial banks have played a            
dominant role. ‘In Section Five of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, “banking” means the              
accepting, for the purpose of lending or investment, or deposits of money from the public,               
repayable on demand or otherwise, and withdrawable by cheque, draft, order or other’(Joshi,             
2016, 31). 
“It is not a mere theory, but a very tangible fact that banks, as the coordinating centres                 
and observation posts of economic activities, transcend national as well as ideological frontiers             
in this modern age. At the present stage of development, banks are alone capable of ushering the                 
surplus production, — and surplus production does exist even in the poorest districts of the               
poorest countries — into productive investment and thus promote technical progress and human             
welfare. When we speak about "underdeveloped" territories, we could more accurately use the             
term ''under-banked" territories.” ​(The Banking System and Rural India, George A Floris,           
Economic and Political Weekly on July 2, 1960) 
George A Floris’ report on the banking system in India in 1960 addresses the need for the                 
establishment of a “Rural Banking Society”, and he addresses the ‘practical proposition’ of             
opening branches in villages, and its hardships in the short-run. More importantly, he addresses              
that the ‘novel approach’ would be to devise a way to expose ‘local cash’ from ‘haystacks and                 
pillow cases into the savings books and current accounts’.  
There is long literature that establishes the positive impact of ‘an efficient and extended              
financial sector on economic growth and development’(Larquemin, 2015, 1). However, for an            
emerging economy like India, it is important for the institution to leverage financial behaviour              
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based on existing regional disparities (for example, socioeconomic status and income inequality).            
Hence, there is a lot to understand about, the ‘link between public institutions and the effect of                 
their policies and initiatives on financial inclusion’ (Larquemin, 2016, 1) and a great need to               
adopt a tangible roadmap for financial inclusion by the institution.  
In accordance with Floris’ proposition (among others) of a rural banking society, the             
RBI’s inclusion policy originated after the RBI took control over operations in the banking              
system. The year 1969 was a landmark in the history of commercial banking, where fourteen               
major commercial banks were created with regard to expanding rural bank branch networks and              
to ‘equalize individual access to banks across Indian states’ (Burgess & Pande, 2005). Then              
heavily functioning as an agro-centric economy, the country was going through a phase of the               
'green revolution', for which there was a need for rich farmers in the countryside to be able to                  
access liquidity appropriately. The Government of India and the Reserve Bank of India both              
made 'concerted efforts' to channel financial inclusion into the national objectives of the country,              
by making radical changes with a focus on ‘social and development banking’. Before bank              
nationalization, the rural countryside was not considered to be a problem of commercial banks.  
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2.2 The Evolution of Financial Inclusion Movement in India 
2.2.1 Bank Nationalization: The Unevenness of Directed Credit regimes (1970-1991)  
In 1969, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi confirmed the nationalization of commercial           
banks, so as to have the ‘non-wealthy’ access banking facilities (Karmakar 2008, 20). The goals               
set for nationalization by the financial regulators were as follows: “to stop corporations from              
controlling all banks, to use bank resources to distribute wealth more equally; to organize public               
savings (including the rural areas); and to focus on agriculture and small industry” (Karmakar              
2008, 20). 
Before financial inclusion became a priority for economic reforms, initial efforts were            
launched for the agricultural sector by the National Bank For Agriculture And Rural              27
Development ( ​NABARD) in 1975, with the creation of a network of rural financial institutions              
called ‘Regional Rural Banks’ (RRB), promoted by the state governments and the RBI. These              
efforts aimed to make ‘cheap credit products available to poor households for asset creation’ , as               28
rural markets in India then were ‘imperfect and fragmented’ (Ramachandran and Swaminathan,            
2004, 1). 
According to Mahajan and Laskar (2010, 6), RRBs were ‘instrumental in extending credit for              
poverty alleviation schemes’ as it provided access to institutional credit for the weaker sections              
of the rural community. One such scheme of directed credit was the Integrated Rural              
Development Programme (IRDP).  
27 “Agriculture plays a vital role in the Indian economy, with more than 70% of the rural households depending on                    
agriculture as their principal means of livelihood. India is the second largest agricultural land with 157.35 million                 
hectares. The GDP of agriculture and allied sectors in India was recorded at US$ 1 billion in 2014 with a growth of                      
3.6% (Larquemin 2015, 3, p. 3) 
28 Larquemin 2015, 4 
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The role of the government during this scheme was to identify ‘Below Poverty Line’              
(BPL) families and monitor activities ‘for which they are to be given a loan’. Once individuals                
managed to receive loans, they were ‘reluctant to repay’ because the poor borrowers incurred              
informal expenses and wage loss, in availing a INR 7000 loan through the IRDP scheme . The                29
downside of this scheme was that no formal banking source had a role in identifying the                
activities of borrowers, attracting political interest, leading to corruption (Mahajan and Laskar,            
2010). A World Bank document about the IRDP argues that it would be unrealistic to assume                
that most poor households would be able to propel themselves out of poverty over a short period                 
of time (Puley, 1989, 13, 27). This is in reference to the measures of success for IRDP that are                   
based on short-term data (Puley, 1989 Annex 1, 66). Additionally, the national average of              
success for ‘eligible beneficiaries’ in every state was 69%, although the national average for              
beneficiaries who have yet to repay credit is 56%, leading to low recovery rates by institutions.                
IRDP’s objectives on the other hand, were long-term measures. The prevalent problems that             
hindered the delivery and repayment of loans were the low recovery rates and loan-overdues, and               
this led to capital erosion, thus increasing the RRBs dependance of other sources of finance.  
At this point, ‘bad debts of RRBs and commercial banks linked to IRDP mounted’              
(Mahajan and Laskar, 2010, 7), and the low point in this history of ‘directed credit’ was that ‘it                  
led to a complete collapse of the idea that banks could be used for social lending’ ( ​ibid., ​8​) ​.                  
RRBs rose from 5 in 1975 to 196 in number by 2004, and accounted for 30% of all rural                   
branches of scheduled commercial banks except their share in total agricultural credit has             
remained between 6-9% (Report of the Expert Group on Agricultural Indebtedness). Figure 6             
29 World Bank data, cited by: Mahajan and Laskar (2010) study the transaction costs in availing a loan of average                    
size of INR 7000, where the poor borrowers incurred 18.9% towards informal expenses and wage loss. 
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shows the low recovery rates during the 1990s, with a high CD ratio of 83.7% in 1991 versus                  
after bank liberalization, where a lower CD ratio was maintained. 
Figure 6: Performance Indicators of RRBs from 1991-2005, ​figures in INR Crores ​ (Source: 
NABARD data, arranged by the Expert Group on Agricultural Indebtedness) 
 
The poor design of long-term asset creation through the IRDP scheme was ‘in the hands of                
asset-poor households’ (Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2004, 6). Jean Dreze (1990) argues           
that his findings did not imply that the IRDP was a ‘completely useless program’, and if it were                  
to be ‘flawlessly implemented’, one could expect a ‘radical reduction of rural poverty’ (Jean              
Dreze, 1990, A-101). The cynical behaviour of bank officials translated to their action of              
speaking up in seminars about ‘the impact of rural credit of the greying of bank personnel and                 
the thinning of their ranks’. Liberalization had an effect of eventually crippling RRBs,             
“rendering them incapable of fulfilling their original mandate” (Ramachandran and          
Swaminathan, 2004). Between bank nationalization and liberalization, the second phase of           
banking in India was an attempt to consolidate the institutional infrastructure of rural banking.              
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Shetty (1997, 253) points out that there was “an unprecedented growth of commercial banking in               
terms of both geographical spread and functional reach”, referring to the increase in commercial              
bank offices, aggregate deposits and gross credit outstanding .  30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 See Appendix I of Ramachandran and Swaminathan 2004 
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2.2.2 Liberalization of the Indian Banking Sector (MFIs, SHGs & Aadhaar) 
While there have been numerous steps toward an economic reform in the 1980s, India’s              
financial revolution only began in 1991, ‘in the wake of a ‘balance of payments’ crisis.               
(Ravallion, 2016). The third phase in the Banking reform was ‘liberalization’. The objectives of              
this era in banking were listed in the Report of the Committee on the Financial System, chaired                 
by M. Narasimham . The opening paragraph of the report called for “a vibrant and competitive               31
financial system… to sustain the ongoing reform in the structural aspects of the real economy”.               
This represented a ‘clear and explicit reversal of the policy of social and development banking’               
(Mahajan and Laskar, 2010, 8). The Committee also advised the redistribution order “should use              
the instrumentality of the fiscal rather than the credit system” and phase out directed credit               
programmes. This inversion in the system only led to an unimaginable set of reforms in the                
banking sector, as the new institutional structure was market-driven and purely based on levels              
of profitability. The reforms that were posed by the Narasimhan committee were criticized             
heavily due to its ‘bureaucratic failures and insensitivity to the social and economic contexts’              
(Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2004, 7).  
The policy reforms under financial liberalisation had a dramatic and direct effect on rural              
credit. There was a ‘contraction in rural banking and in priority sector lending and preferential               
lending to the poor in particular’ ( ​Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2002, Shetty 2004, Chavan             
2004). Mahajan and Laskar (2010) argue that ‘it represented a clear and explicit reversal of the                
policy of social and development banking’. MFIs and SHGs were integral in initiating             
programmes and schemes that aimed at reducing poverty, but their sustainability was jeopardized             
31 See Akrani, G. (2010, September 16). Narasimham Committee Report 1991 1998 - Recommendations for all                
Economic Liberalization reforms in India 
 
  
       42  
(especially SHGs), because of the quest of higher inclusion. Microcredit on the other hand, was               
catered to those low income households that were already engaged in economic activity, leaving              
out the poorer households (Mahajan, 1997). 
 
A. Microfinance Institutions & Self Help Groups 
Microcredit and microfinance have both been given great regard in development literature, right             
from when the influential policy objectives were formed by Grameen Bank by Muhammad             
Yunus in 1976. It aimed to disburse small loans, from borrowers in poor communities, and that                
the loans would generate income through self-employment. 
In the 1990s in India, microfinance institutions (MFIs) helped further open credit            32
markets to remote locations in India. This was the origin of a ‘system inversion’ i.e, credit                
markets became more inclusive in objective, with the assumption that transaction costs of banks              
can be lowered significantly, if the costs are ‘passed on to NGOs or self-help groups’               
(Ramachandran and Swaminathan 2004, 12).  
Self-help groups were organized for poor women to help pool savings in a ‘common              
kitty’, out of which they would disburse small loans amongst each other. Research has shown               
that SHGs had a positive impact on women, and the use of microcredit helped generate income,                
especially in the state of Andhra Pradesh (Lazar, 2008, 39). The NPCI began a ‘pilot project’ on                 
February 24, 2017, in collaboration with the Aadhaar Payment Bridge System (ABPS) to             33
initiate digital payments within the microfinance sector (Svatantra Microfinance) . 34
32 See Yunus, M. (2004). Grameen Bank, Microcredit and Millennium Development Goals. ​Economic and Political               
Weekly​. 
33 See Section 2.3 
34 See Nandi, A., Kamlesh, P. M., & Nandan, S. (2016, May). Directory of Microfinance Institutions (MFI) in India                   
(Publication) 
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SHGs were later ‘digitized’ in 2016. Using paper-less models, group transactions for            
loans were monitored, with the potential of bringing in accountability. Chapter 3 will expand              
upon the digitization of the banking system through the PMJDY reform. 
 
B. The Aadhaar Miracle: How to Know Your Customer 
Dunning, Gelb and Raghavan (2004), set the agenda to the ‘Millennium Development            
Goals’ in 2014, and they assessed the importance of registering legal identity and birth              
registration. The objective for incorporating the two registrations were “inclusive development           
and access to services; it is no accident that those lacking birth registration and legal identity are                 
typically the most vulnerable people in the poorest countries.” ( ​ibid.) 
The “Aadhaar” is a unique twelve-digit identification number, issued by the Unique            
Identity Authority of India (UIDAI), for citizens of India with the aim of providing them with a                 
‘quick and easy’ access to their financial address (Kansal, 2014, 5). The program was launched               
in January 2009. As of March 30, 2017 it was reported that 93% (1.12 billion people) of the                  
population above the age of 18, enrolled in unique identities , with the ability to link it to                 35
schemes for the “disbursal of benefits under welfare programmes run by the Centre and states”               
(Mazzotta and Chakravorti 2014, 67).  
The Aadhaar was created in a time where the RBI had ‘consciously chosen a bank-led               
model over a telecom-led one’ ( ​ibid., 6) ​. Its role in the financial sector was to create ‘financial                 
prosperity to each stakeholder in the system including residents, government and service            
providers’ (Kansal 2014, 3) . The Aadhaar eased the process of opening bank accounts for the                
35 Saldanha, A. (2017, March 30). 1.12 billion Indians have Aadhaar numbers by now. Here's how Modi government                  
plans to sign up the rest. The Economic Times. Retrieved May 1, 2017 
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marginalised sectors of society. Previously, the only valid identities were: passport, driver’s            
licence, Voter’s ID or a PAN Card . Unfortunately, not all citizens under the poverty line               36
possessed any of these documents. To register for an Aadhaar, beneficiaries had to provide :              37
Demographic Information (Name, DOB, Age, Gender, Address etc) and Biometric Information           
(Ten fingerprints, two iris scans and a facial photograph). Using the Aadhaar as a financial               
address brought the identification of an individual under the government’s radar to track: transfer              
of government benefits to the poor, person to person payments, and credit card transactions. It               
also enabled the ‘e-KYC’ process, an electronic form of ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC). Kansal              
(2014, 3) quotes: “The resident’s data can be verified by the relevant branch or Business               
Correspondent (BC) electronically in a matter of seconds and relevant information can also be              
auto-updated to the service provider’s database with appropriate consent from the resident”. In             
Nandan Nilekani’s book (then the chairman of UIDAI) , ​‘In Imagining India: Ideas for the New                
Century’ (2010), ​he writes about an IT driven, national identity system that “would be nothing               
less than a revolutionary in how India distributes state benefits and welfare hand-outs’, through              
the Direct Benefit Transfer system (DBT).  
According to the Economic Survey 2007-08 and National Survey Sample Office , 93%            38
of the population works in the unorganized sector or the informal economy. The Aadhaar aimed               
to provide a platform for opening bank accounts enabled through a ‘token-less’ digital identity              
and allow ‘residents of the informal economy to start saving money with banks and perform               
various transactions via Business Correspondents (BCs). The BC provides services at the ‘point             
36 ​ ​Permanent Account Number (​PAN ​) 
37 See ‘About Aadhaar’. Retrieved February, 2017, from https://uidai.gov.in/your-aadhaar/about-aadhaar.html 
38Ministry of Finance. (2008). Economic Survey 2007-08 (English). Retrieved February, 2017 
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of customer interface and a retail outlet’ (Mazzotta and Chakravorti 2014, 66). Figure 7 is the                
growth of Banking Correspondents (BCs) in India from 2010 to 2013. BC units grew from               
34,532 to 1,95,380 from 2010-2013 (Figure 7, LTP Data). The privatised BCs used innovative              
models to ease the delivery mechanism, at low transaction costs. The low penetration of formal               
banking infrastructure led the RBI to introduce BCs. Banks deployed more than INR 19 million               
BCs, covering 221,000 villages as of March 31, 2013 . 39
Figure 7: Banking Correspondents (BCs) in India, ​growth from 2010-2013 ​(Source: RBI data, 
arranged by LTP) 
 
 
39 Team, LTP. (2014, March 05). Banking Correspondent: A Channel For Financial Inclusion in India & Micro                 
ATMs. Retrieved March, 2017 
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Figure 8: Progress made under financial inclusion plans - as of September 2016 
(Scheduled commercial banks including RRBs) 
(Source: RBI) 
 
 
Furthermore, Figure 8 shows the progress of financial inclusion plans. With focus on the              
branchless mode of banking in rural locations, bank outlets grew exponentially from 34,316 units              
(year ended March 2010) to 534,477 units in March 2016. Basic savings and deposit functions               
under BCs also grew from INR 10.7 million in 2010 to INR 181.1 million in 2016. In addition to                   
the banking facilities, the Government and RBI have prepared a framework to ‘grade’ and              
provide a ‘certification training program’, to improve financial literacy. BCs who have a good              
track record would ‘undergo advanced training and receive certification’ to be ‘entrusted with             
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more complex tasks such as handling/delivery of financial products that go beyond            
deposits/remittances’ . 40
 
2.3 Current Infrastructure: Aadhaar Based Systems and Payment Systems 
India is an emerging market, that is attempting to minimize the use of cash transactions,               
by winning support from the industry participants to continue the war on cash, and remove the                
impediments towards using it. The industry participants are looking to ‘create a digital trail’ for               
financial transactions, to better assess the creditworthiness of borrowers . In truth, there is an              41
equivalent need of financial literacy, to certainly assess the sensitivity of such disruptions in              
banking and for institutions in order to measure adoption. The Task Force of the Aadhaar               
Payment Infrastructure prepared a report in 2012, leading to the preparation of the Payments              
Vision documents (2012-2015) after which corresponding business models have emerged to           
redefine unserved markets, keeping up with, and leveraging the available technology and            
infrastructure.  
 
A. Aadhaar Payments Bridge System (APBS) 
A standardized “electronic benefit transfer system to undertake direct mandates from           
respective sponsor or accredited bank attached to various government departments for the            
purpose of disbursing entitlements using Aadhaar numbers” (NPCI, ABPS Overview, 2016). The            
objective of the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) to use APBS, was to narrow the                
40 RBI. (2016, December 29). Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2015-16, Chapter V: Financial                  
Inclusion: Policy and Progress (India, Reserve Bank of India). p. 40-41 Retrieved February 4, 2017, 
41 Companies like Funds-Tiger, Faircent, Indifi and Credit Mantri are credit evaluators who leverage the data trail                 
created by individuals to catch fraud, outliers etc. from Verma, V. (2017, January 17). Why the ban on Rs.500 and                    
Rs 1000 is great news for FinTech in India? Retrieved March, 2017. 
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gap between the beneficiary and the institution to be able to route transfers and support benefit                
schemes like NREGA, Social Security Pensions, and even PMJDY Account products:           
payment/remittance services to migrant labors, and other unorganized sectors, through ‘online           
and real-time’ biometric authentication (Ramesha, Bapat et. al. 2014, 13).  
B. Aadhaar Enabled Payment System (AEPS) 
This system allows interoperable transactions at Business Correspondent (BC) outlets,          
giving a customer the liberty to walk in, using biometric authentication (provided by UIDAI) to               
conduct the following: 
● Withdraw cash 
● Deposit cash 
● See balance inquiry 
● View mini statement 
This payment system is managed by the NPCI. 
C. Mobile Banking 
There are various kinds of mobile payment systems. Most are usually operated by private              
players in the market. Kenya’s M-PESA payment system was launched in 2007 by Vodafone              
through a public-private partnership. Operating under a branchless model, M-PESA transactions           
represented ‘roughly two-thirds’ of national payment volume, at a low transaction cost . The              42
Task Force on an Aadhaar-Enabled Unified Payments Infrastructure makes recommendations          
based on past success stories to adopt Mobile Banking faster in India. In 2009, the Government                
permitted banks to offer this service ‘subject to a daily cap of INR 50,000 on funds transfers, and                  
42 McKay, C., & Mazer, R. (2014, October 01). 10 Myths About M-PESA: 2014 Update [Web log post]. Retrieved                   
October, 2016 
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transactions involving the purchase of goods and services’ , liberalizing the possibilities of ‘high             43
volume-low value transactions in deposits and payments/remittance services in a secured           
technology driven environment’ (Larquemin, 2015, 13). In 2014, the World Bank reported that             
low-income populations benefit the most from technological innovations such as mobile           
payments, mobile banking and borrower identification based on fingerprinting and iris scans . 44
The NPCI operates a service called Inter-bank Mobile/Immediate Payment System          
(IMPS), founded in 2010, followed by RuPay after the advent of the PMJDY which initiated the                
possibility of peer to peer transfers. In 2016, the NPCI launched the ‘Unified Payments Interface’               
(UPI). The UPI serves the following purposes: 
● It leverages the IMPS architecture for immediate payments . 45
● Customers receive a better experience through primary device binding, meaning that they            
may enter a secondary level of personal credentials.  
● Ability to receive payments based on a beneficiary’s Virtual Payment Address (VPA) 
India has seemed to skip the ‘plastic’ phase (credit/debit cards), and cut into searching for               
opportunities in the app-enabled potentiality of the smartphone.  
 
D. Payment Wallets (Telco-bank led model)  
The mobile has been able to create financial access ‘at a low cost’, except it has still not                  
been adopted as the ‘preferred channel for the delivery of financial services’, based on the slow                
growth of the volume of banking transactions through mobile banking. Payment wallets have             
43 ​ In 2014, the RBI removed the cap for all ‘application based encrypted transactions 
44 “World Bank. 2014. Global Financial Development Report 2014 : Financial Inclusion. Overview. Washington,              
DC. © World Bank. 
45 Privacy note: The customer need not publish the account number, but use a Virtual Payment Address (VPA) 
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been able to create inroads through an easy interface (mobile app), minimum KYC requirements              
and instant transactions through a single factor authentication (biometric data) and cash backs. 
Some examples of Payment Bank Wallets are: ‘Paytm’, ‘Jio Money’, ‘Airtel Money’ and             
‘Vodafone m-Pesa’.  
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Chapter Three: Financial Inclusion post-Demonetization 
 
The Demonetization exercise clearly undermined the 'special efforts' at tackling financial            
exclusion, through erratic policy issuances. Emerging economies till date, are striving to build an              
economically inclusive system to improve economic growth. It stands both as a priority and a               
challenge for all developing nations around the world. According to Demirg-Kunt et. al (2014),              
they assessed the Global Findex Database, and found that 62% of adults worldwide have an               
account at a bank or another type of financial institution or with a mobile money provider.                
Account penetration on the other hand, has its differences in low-income, high-income groups:             
89% in high-income countries and 24% in low income countries.  
India has reached a common ground on the importance of Financial Inclusion. After the              
struggling efforts of RRBs , MFIs and SHGs, the financial regulators of the country, along with                
relevant public stakeholders, have been proactive in the creation of tailor-made systems, as             
state-specific exercises. Past initiatives focused on India's agro-centric growth potential , but           46
over the years, it has moved to a central, more standard format. The launch of the Pradhan                 
Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana has been a pillar of urgent implementation of Financial Inclusion, to               
meet the objectives post-Demonetization of converting the Indian economy into a 'cashless            
society'. 
46Agriculture plays a vital role in the Indian economy with more than 70% of rural households depending on                  
agriculture as their principal means of livelihood.  
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This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 introduces the current situation of             
Financial Inclusion in India, the current institutional framework and the PMJDY initiative:            
objectives, progress, challenges with adoption (Literature review), followed by Section 3.2           
which introduces the emergence of an electronic payments system in the Indian Economy and its               
relationship with current financial inclusion measures and potential to bring the informal sector             
under the radar of regulated banking. 
 
3.1 Financial Inclusion: An Identity & Technological Disruption in an Ocean of Credit 
“Poverty and exclusion continue to dominate socio-economic and political discourse in India as             
they have done over the last six-decades in the post-independence period”. ​ - K.C Chakrabarty  
 
As introduced in Chapter One, after the economy was liberalized, credit markets became             
more inclusive, and created a long-drawn discourse amongst the financial regulators of the             
country, post-financial liberalization. Financial Inclusion is indeed a strong pre-requisite to           
achieve ‘greater economic and social equity’. As of 2014, in a country of 1.2 billion people, the                 
population that held a debit card was only ‘155 million out of 800 million bankable individuals’.                
(Mazzotta and Chakravorti 2014, 61).  
The biggest challenge for the financial authorities in India, and the world so far, has been                
to be able to provide financial products at a ‘low transaction cost’ (Joshi 2016). The outreach of                 
formalized financial products in transition economies like India, have been backed by            
nationalized private banks, that stipulated interest rate ceilings while extending credit to            
low-income households. Additionally, many legislative bodies even defined the ‘right of access            
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to formal banking services’ (Ghosh 2008, 1) and enacted policies relevant as such. Figure 9               
represents the ‘Dimensions of Access Problems’ in the rural banking system. Joshi (2016) writes              
that there is ‘enormous untapped growth potential’ that can be indicated by the percentage of the                
population holding bank accounts, insurance protection and debit /credit cards to ‘distribution of             
availability’ of banking infrastructure across many states in India. She proceeds to say that these               
areas have still not been exploited, due to ‘lack of access to finance at a reasonable cost’. Many                  
countries have formulated reforms within the existing structure of ‘credit delivery and extant             
institutional infrastructure’. For example, Indian post offices have credit accounts that have been             
able to promote community-based savings and credit society structures, making the financial            
facility more accessible, and ‘bringing banking to the doorstep’. 
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Figure 9: Dimensions of Access Problems (Source:Joshi, 2016, 58) 
 
“There is a striking correlation between the level of economic development, such as             
measures by GDP per capita, and various measures of what can be termed as ‘good               
institutions” ​—​the basic infrastructure needed to support a reasonably efficient market          
economy”. ​  (Ravallion 2016, 539) 
With a similar intention of building a good institution, the government of India has been               
conceiving steps to provide banking services at an affordable cost. To be termed, a ‘good               
institution’ to execute such activities, the financial regulators of India have motivated institutions             
to take the right steps. Taking into account the current status of financial inclusion indicators in                
India, an RBI Press Release on November 12, 2016 promised the population the ‘sought to               
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transfer the problem of ensuring a smooth payments system’ to alleviate the public’s inadequacy              
of currency (Ghosh, Chandrasekhar, Patnaik, 2017, 95). It stated that:  
 
“…the public are encouraged to switch over to alternate models of payment, such as pre-paid               
cards, Rupay/Credit/Debit cards, mobile banking, internet banking. All those for whom banking            
accounts under Jan Dhan Yojana are opened, and cards are issued, are urged to put them to use.                  
Such usage will alleviate the pressure on the physical currency and also enhance the experience               
of living in the digital world.” ​(RBI Press Release, 2016) 
 
According to the RBI, as of 2014, 41% of India is absolutely unbanked and only 14.6%                
of the population possesses a debit card (Mazzotta and Chakravorti 2014, 61). This is certainly in                
line with the obstacles faced by the supply-side of the banking system’s infrastructure.             
Corruption holds as the highest percentage of constraint for financial infrastructure in India,             
according to an article published by the World Economic Forum by Vangelis Papakonstantinou.             
In 2013, less than 130,000 ATMs and 1 million POS Terminals were operational unevenly in               47
both rural and urban areas. This translates to the statistic, that 6% of 15 million merchants                
dealing in business related activities, are ineligible to hold a terminal (6% dealt in cash-based               
transactions). Therefore, it is apparent that debit cards are used for ATM withdrawals (92%              
transaction volume) more than ten times as frequently as for purchases of commodities (8%)              
(Mazzotta and Chakravorti, 2014, 61). However, India currently seems to be skipping the             
47 POS Terminals: Point of Sale Systems 
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‘plastic’ phase, due to high volume cash withdrawals via debit cards, and moving to the digitized                
circle via mobile. 
There have been many exploratory initiatives to reduce the high cash usage in the Indian               
economy by the Government, with the intention of bringing down the cost of currency operations              
by the private sector and the government (It takes INR 4.13 billion to route INR 2.93 trillion in                   48
diverse subsidies) among other objectives. The cost of handling currency is characterized by             
'inordinate delays, leakages, and heavy reliance on manual labor, mainly because of India’s             
inclination towards cash payments (Mazzotta and Chakravorti, 2014, 61). These initiatives were            
commenced stringently, by the Government of India in a structured manner since the mid-70s by               
NABARD through the creation of Regional Rural Banks. Today, the ‘main actors’ of financial              
inclusion policy are the Government of India and the Reserve Bank of India, who have put                
technology at the center of the initiatives, ‘believing in its role to foster financial inclusion’               
(Larquemin, 2015, 8). In 2014, the Governor of the RBI, Mr. Raghuram Rajan made a               
declaration that financial inclusion was about , (i) “the broadening of financial services to those              49
who do not have access to financial services, (ii) the deepening of financial services for people                
who have minimal financial services and (iii) greater financial literacy and consumer protection”. 
In 2013, when the ‘National Mission for Financial Inclusion’ (PMJDY) was announced,            
PM Modi emphasized in an email to CEOs to all banks that declaring a bank account ‘for each                  
household was a national priority’. The RBI saw the ‘lack of identification documents’ among              
customers who were unable to open bank accounts due to inadequate personal information.             
48See Ehrbeck, T., Lochan, R., Tahilyani, N., & Zainulbhai, A. (2010, October). Inclusive growth and financial                
security (Rep.). 
49Rajan, R., Dr. (2016, July 18). The changing paradigm for financial inclusion. Retrieved March, 2017. 
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Before understanding the guidelines of this scheme, it is imperative to re-read the functions of               
the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) and the National Identity Card Program             
(Aadhaar) that was launched in January 2009, that was an easer of the KYC norms that was set                  
in stone earlier. 
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3.1.1 Recent Approaches by the RBI for Private/Public Sector Banks and Regional Rural Banks:              
Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana 
On August 28, 2014, the most ambitious and recent scheme announced by Prime Minister              
Modi called ‘Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana’ (PMJDY), was launched in the historic Red Fort               
in Delhi, for ‘comprehensive financial inclusion’ (Shettar, 2016, 17). It was designed to ensure              
universal access to banking services starting with basic bank accounts. The aim of the scheme               
was to have the lower and weaker sections of the unbanked/but bankable Indian society access to                
banking facilities, financial literacy and access to credit, insurance and pension facility. Starting             
with ‘Basic Banking Accounts (Basic Saving Bank Deposit or BSBD) with an overdraft facility              
of INR 5000 after six months and a ‘RuPay’ Debit card with inbuilt accident insurance cover of                 
INR 100,000. The slogan for the PMJDY was: "Mera Khata Bhagya Vidhaata' which translates              
to "People's Wealth Scheme". The underlying principle was based on the previously mentioned             
condition of the unbanked household population in 2011, before the scheme was announced:             
"about 2/5 of households" (105 million out of 250 million households) did not have access to                
basic banking services. With the spirit of inclusive growth in mind, the government scheme has               
undertaken the right efforts, and put in place the favorable regulations. Kaur & Singh (2015, 26)                
highlight the RBI initiatives in the scheme as the following: 
(i) Opening of no-frills accounts with overdraft facility; 
(ii) Relaxation on know-your-customer (KYC) norms; 
(iii) Engaging business correspondents (BCs) or 'Bank Mitras' ; 50
50 "preferably a lady from amongst the community who is provided with the knowledge of doing subsidiary banking                  
works like documents preparation of SHG’s for account opening, credit linkage, receipt filling in the bank when the                  
members reach the bank premises either for withdrawing or depositing the amount and supporting the bank with                 
such similar works as required by the branch". - Team, I. (2015, June 20). The functions of a bank mitra in Financial                      
Inclusion. Retrieved March, 2017. 
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(iv) Use of Technology; 
(v) Simplified branch authorization; 
(vi) Opening of branches in unbanked rural areas. 
 
3.1.2 PMJDY Objectives  
The financial inclusion policy devised by the Government of India and the Reserve Bank of               
India is based on six core objectives that were ‘scheduled to be achieved in two phases’ (PMJDY                 
Circular, 2014): 
 
Phase I (15 August 2014 - 14 August 2015): 
1) Universal access to banking facilities (within 5km distance of each village) 
2) Providing basic banking accounts ('no frills account') for saving and remittance and            
‘RuPay’  
3) Debit Card with in-built accident insurance cover of INR 100,000 
4) Financial Literacy Program  
 
Phase II (15 August 2015 - 15 August 2018): 
1) Overdraft facility of up to INR 5000 after 6 months of satisfactory performance of              
saving/credit history (a credit guarantee fund would be created for coverage of defaults in              
overdraft accounts); 
2) Micro-insurance; 
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3) Unorganized sector pension schemes like Swalamban  51
The authorities relied on previous Anti-poverty initiatives (see Chapter Two under bank            
Nationalization) to conceive the new scheme, and appointed BCs (Bank Mitras) in underbanked             
locations. The implementation considered the positive externalities of financial inclusion: ‘it           
leads to increase in savings and investment and thereby spurs the processes of economic growth’               
(Divya and Abirami, 2016, 36-37) and that financial inclusion through PMJDY would            
'commence the next revolution of growth and prosperity' (Kaur & Singh, 2015). Additionally, all              
relevant stakeholders were involved in stitching this scheme towards the process of ‘improving             
and deepening financial inclusion’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 pro-poor initiative by PM Modi with shram-yogi: self reliance (swavalamban), self independence (swashray) and               
self-dignity (swabhimaan) mantras imbibed by the scheme to fight poverty  
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3.1.3 Progress of PMDJY Scheme 
The scheme was implemented with an introductory target of 75 million new            
accounts ‘within five months with insurance and pension facilities’ (Shettar, 2016, 21). It was              
informed that 76.4 million bank accounts were open under the PMJDY scheme on November 18,               
2014 (Press Release, Ministry of Finance, 2014), which is almost 14% more than they had               
anticipated within just three months. As for the scheme’s adoption, it has been moderately              
successful, especially since an emphasis was laid on ‘key sectors like agriculture and             
Small-Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) consisting of self-employed workers.  
The two figures below show differences in account uptake from the year 2014 (Four              
months after PMJDY scheme announcement) to 2017 (Demonetization effect). There was an            
exponential growth in terms of successfully opening PMJDY accounts for individuals who fit the              
newly generated KYC-norms. As of February 28, 2015, a total of 136.8 million accounts (Singh               
& Sadana, 2015) had been opened within just six months after the announcement of the scheme,                
receiving attention from the 'Guinness Book of World Records' for "the most number of bank               
accounts opened in one week" .  52
 
52India makes financial world record as millions open new bank accounts. Guinness World Records (2015, January                
20). Retrieved May 02, 2017.  
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Figure 10: ​Month-wise Progress Report of PMJDY by Public Sectors Banks/Regional Rural 
Banks/Private Banks upto 25-Nov-2015 ​ (Source:OGD Platform) 
 
Figure 10 shows that public sector banks outperformed (based on the number of zero              
balance accounts, number of RuPay Cards issued and average deposit per account) both regional              
rural banks as well as private sector banks. The total number of accounts opened in the public                 
sector are 151386532, RRBs are 34762369 and private banks at 7288273. Bhandari (2015, 179)              
finds that in 2015, 61% of the accounts were opened in urban areas and 39% of the total accounts                   
were present in rural areas (The total number of accounts on January 1, 2015 were 110062417).  
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Figure 11: ​Month-wise Progress Report of PMJDY by Public Sectors Banks/Regional Rural 
Banks/Private Banks upto 25-May-2016 ​(Source: OGD Platform) 
 
Figure 11 shows progression in the number of accounts opened in 2016, as compared to the                
statistics in Figure 10. Additionally, the number of accounts opened with an Aadhaar seeding for               
all banks (public, RRBs and private) were higher in 2016, versus the accounts opened with a zero                 
balance in 2015. More beneficiaries in 2016 engaged in the use of BCs (See growth of BCs:                 
Figure 7), and availed the Aadhaar to facilitate payments in various deposit and withdrawal              
activity. In 2017, This showcases the public’s perception of Demonetization, in terms of             
adopting new methods of transaction. 
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3.1.4 Challenges with Duplicate Accounts and Adoption 
In the fiscal year of 2014, the 'spearheaded' RBI initiative assisted in opening sixty              
million new bank accounts (PMJDY website). It was not mandatory for an individual to link               
their Aadhaar Identification number to the PMJDY bank accounts . 53
 
Kochhar (2014) ​argues against the duplicacy account issue, promoting the Aadhaar           
based authentication system, to ‘eliminate duplicate accounts and fake identities at the point of              
delivery’. He also argues that the ‘fool proof identity authentication’ makes sure that people              
weed out the invalid or ‘downright bogus’ beneficiaries. 
 
Gupta (2015) states that there was a discrepancy between the KYC norms set by the                
RBI in reality, versus the KYC norms listed in the conventional plans of the scheme. In reality,                 
the KYC norms were 'significantly diluted' as they permitted bank customers to produce 'any              
document' to open the account, and this resulted in a large chunk of duplicate accounts, resulting                
in the account holders to be entitled to avail the benefits of the scheme (INR 5000 overdraft                 
facility, free insurance facility and a free debit card).  
 
Bhatia & Singh (2015) highlight the challenges of the PMJDY Scheme in terms of its               
spread—both demand side and supply side challenges. They theorize that “the supply factors are              
to a great extent, expected to reduce the supply side constraints with the help of the                
implementation of a few central government policies”. The demand side challenges are: low             
53PMJDY Frequently Asked Questions 
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literacy levels, lack of awareness about financial products and services, and lack of trust in               
formal banking mechanisms. The supply side challenges are: limited service providers, higher            
levels of regulation and non-availability of rural branches.  
 
Shettar (2016) ​sheds light on the fact that there were many cases of individuals opening               
more than one account in various banks, due to fragmented KYC norms by banks, that made                
'duplication unavoidable'. She identifies that BCs (Business correspondents or Bank Mitras)           
should be properly trained with 'accurate knowledge, skill and attitude' and that the outcome of               
the training program will be visible in terms of accomplishing the target.  
 
Dasgupta and Anklesaria (2015) have also highlighted the key challenges that could            
potentially hinder the success of the scheme in India, mainly infrastructural issues and the ability               
to fight account dormancy, while managing the 'ecosystem of business correspondents' by having             
the relevant stakeholders-- RBI, central and state government, banks, local bodies and other             
government agencies like NABARD and NPCI to build a 'sustainable eco-system' to keep these              
accounts from escaping dormancy.  
 
Bhatt and Pawar (2015) found that more than 50% of the unbanked/underbanked            
population was not aware of the PMJDY scheme and the reason why accounts were dormant               
after being opened, was due to 'low connectivity to banking facility'. 
 
 
 
  
       66  
3.1.5 Discussion  
The literature expressed by the economists above, are individuals represented by reputed            
educational institutions and/or personnel associated with the banking policy making bodies of            
India. The RBI has recently showcased progressive moves, to help improve the landscape for              
financial inclusion in India. As of 2014, India had a working population of 600 million people,                
with only 200 million bank account holders. The Jan Dhan model achieved substantial inclusion              
in terms of coverage. They were successful in creating an effective regulatory ecosystem, and its               
leverage on technology towards 2017 elevated the effects of the program. The Business             
Correspondents in rural areas serve as regional drivers of the scheme, where there is opportunity               
to open the resource base in each state, by developing a culture of savings among large sections                 
of the poor population. The National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) is a ‘system              
developer’ organization appointed by the Government and the RBI (See Section A1 and A2              
under 2.3). It facilitates the standard business process for all payment systems in the nation.               
Section 3.2 will cover the emergence of an electronic payments system in India, and the               
customized products and services offered through the mobile phone, expanding the channels of             
financial inclusion in India. Figure 12 is a flowchart on recent RBI initiatives. 
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Figure 12: Synopsis of Recent Initiatives by the RBI (Source: Larquemin, 2015) 
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3.2 Digital Payments: Relation to Financial Inclusion and the Informal Economy 
The "Payments infrastructure in India is evolving rapidly" (Mazzotta and Chakravorti           
2014, 61). The National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) is the umbrella 'not-for-profit'             
institution (regulated by the Government of India) which was founded in 2008. From 2008-2016,              
the RBI spelled out the keywords when they formulated policy prescriptions: “to ensure that all               
the payment and settlement systems operating in the country are safe, efficient, accessible,             
inclusive, interoperable and authorized” (RBI Payment Vision document, 2012-15).         
Chandrasekhar, Ghosh and Patnaik (2017) refer to the digitization of transactions,           
(post-demonetization) and its ratification, that it "seems to have become a magic wand to deliver               
solutions to all problems, from fighting corruption, to ending poverty, to modernizing society,             
even to ensuring sustainable development". After emphasizing the country's war on cash, the             
financial regulators in the country have; 
● adopted a ‘bank-led model’ for financial inclusion ‘which leverages technology for           
optimization of results’ by setting up ‘payments banks’ and ‘small finance banks’            54
payment and clearing systems were implemented in India's agro-centric economy, with           
the onset of 'real-time gross settlement’ (RTGS), national electronic clearing services           
(NECS), national electronic funds transfer (NEFT), check truncation, and payment cards’           
for high value business payments for SMEs (EY Rep. 2015, 10). 
● Implemented the inclusive potential of the Aadhaar card (launched in 2010), 'RuPay' card             
(launched in 2012), 'Kisan' card (launched in 1998) and the ‘Immediate Payment Service             
(IMPS, launched in 2010 by the NPCI). The rise of Business Correspondents (private             
54Joshi (2016, 114) 
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extension of banking services) led to the rise of a bank-led model of enabling customers               
to avail basic banking services through the unique identity, and the Business            
Correspondent (BC) of any bank. BCs or Bank Mitras allowed the “online interoperable             
financial inclusion transaction at POS (Micro ATM)” (Ramesha and Bapat, 2014). The            
Payments ecosystem would serve as a platform for innovating the BC banking space. 
● Mobile Banking and Payment Wallets based on ‘supportive regulations’ (like M-Pesa in            
Kenya)—allowing Indian market to disrupt the ecosystem with digital consumer          
payments. 
The assumption made by majority of the ‘Fintech’ (Financial Technology) companies in            
India is that better financial governance equates to better tax collection, which would mean that               
the informal economy would be under the radar, thus forcing the shadow economy to alleviate its                
cash dominant activities. This is in line with exactly what the government of India set out to do:                  
‘Catch the Corrupt’.  
Section 3.2.2 of this chapter will expand upon the current adoption of the Payments              
system: Mobile phone adoption, barriers to entry such as current privacy issues and cyber              
security post demonetization, externalities in payment system networks, based on the strict            
guidelines posed by the RBI and the interdependency of the public-private landscape of             
payments in India through the e-KYC integration of the 'Unique Identification Number'            
(Aadhaar), as an indicator of financial inclusion developments in the banking system. This would              
provide more clarity in answering the bigger question of whether the financially deprived             
societies in India, will be able to combat cash transactions and incentivize the demand for ‘white                
money’. (as per the government’s autonomous decisions). 
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Below is the summary of Payment Bank guidelines from the Nachiket Mor Report (Committee              55
on Comprehensive Financial Services for Small Businesses and Low Income Households,           
summary by Larquemin [2015, 12]): 
● Provide each Indian above 18 with an individual, full-service electronic bank account, 
● Setup widely distributed Electronic Payment Access Points offering deposit and          
withdrawal facilities at a reasonable cost. 
● Provide each low-income household, convenient access to formally regulated providers. 
The RBI approved eleven entities (telecom giants and tech companies ) to structure 'payment             56
banks' in 2015. These banks are not allowed to undertake any lending activities (It is to be kept                  
in mind that payment banks digitize payments, not loans but transactions), and in accordance              
with the guidelines (Nachiket Mor Report), payment banks will be able to accept deposits with a                
cap of INR 100,000 per customer. They would be allowed to issue ATM/debit cards (not credit                
cards). Among other channels to simplify payments and remittances, special attention has been             
given to Business Correspondents (BCs), who would also be avid players in financial literacy              
interfaces for application development to assist the unorganized sectors of society.  
On September 16, 2015, The RBI also granted licences to 4 MFIs to open small finance                
banks (SFBs), helping to digitize SHGs (later in 2016) with the cooperation of current              57
commercial banks, RRBs and Cooperative banks, with efficient deposit facilities, through the            
payment system. It had the potential to bring accountability, after digitizing the information of              
55 Guidelines for Licensing of Payments Banks issued on November 27, 2014 
56 Licenses were given to Aditya Birla Nuvo, Airtel MCommerce Services, Cholamandalam Distribution Services,              
Department of Posts, FINO PayTech, National Securities Depository, Reliance Industries, Sun Pharmaceuticals,            
Paytm Tech, Mahindra, Vodafone M-Pesa 
57Chatterjee, S. (2016, September 12). Digitizing Self-Help Groups in India. Retrieved February, 2017. 
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members of self-help groups, to also ‘promote self-reliance in bookkeeping and group level             
decision making’ (Chatterjee, 2016). 
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3.2.1 Adoption and Barriers to Entry 
The only driver for the rise of payments on digital platforms is the increase in user base                 
and acceptance. According to the BCG-Google report on Digital Payments, India ranks 2nd             
place (1 billion mobile subscriptions) in the world. The vision of a State Bank of India (SBI)                 
report was to 'gradually move in a direction where every poor person is able to operate his bank                  
account from his mobile, as mobile penetration is higher than financial services penetration’             
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2014). 
The real roadblock for the Government and RBI is that, India would have to move past                
the plastics for a card-less digital infrastructure that will lower the costs for the consumers,               
merchants. As mentioned in Chapter 3.11, debit cards are used for cash withdrawals, more than               
merchant payments. Figure 13 on the next page (data from the Telecom Regulatory Authority of               
India) shows the increase in mobile subscription with a monthly growth rate of 2.53% for               
wireless connections, and Figure 14 (data from BCG-Google Study) shows the barriers to entry              
when engaging with digital payments. The biggest adoption challenges are the habit to use cash,               
and the complexities that arise in using digital payments. Although, for the rural population, the               
Government has ordered Fintech companies to create interfaces for financial applications on            
mobiles in every regional language in India. This would also urge the educationally literate              
beneficiaries of rural India to transition into mobile payments, tailored in a comprehensible             
manner.  
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Figure 13: Highlights of Telecom Subscription data as on 31 Dec. 2016 (Source: Telecom 
Regulatory Authority of India data) 
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Figure 14: Barriers to Entry in using Non-Cash Payments (Source: BCG market study based on 
Nielsen consumer survey of 1,515 consumers, 2016, ) 
 
On the infrastructural side for MFIs, at this juncture, there are multiple roadblocks with              
the attempt to achieve full financial inclusion, through the integration of digital payments for              
Self-Help Groups. Among several challenges, the constraints that prevent the full actualization of             
digitization include: 
1. Quality of Data​: poor practices in collection of data by institutions ( ​The World Bank is               
unable to guarantee the accuracy of the data included in NABARD’s work  ) 58
58See Srivastava, Pradeep. 2004. Scaling-up access to finance for India's rural poor. Washington, DC: World Bank.                
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/728301468751535430/Scaling-up-access-to-finance-for-Indias-rural-poo
r 
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2. Delays in recording beneficiary process ​, given the staggering flow of data is often             
slowed down due to poor connectivity to the internet, and keeping up with customized              
products to meet issues with the regional disparity in India 
3. Low proliferation of mobile utilization ​: low ownership of tablets and mobiles causes            
beneficiaries to rely on ‘Bank Mitras’ (BCs) and loan collection officers, slowing down             
the loan collection procedure. 
4. Cooperation of BCs and relevant stakeholders: ​Sparse levels financial literacy exists           
among SHG beneficiaries and Bank Mitras themselves (psychological barriers,         59
relevance). 
In India, the relationship between the access to finance and the cost of building relevant               
infrastructure, is complex, due to a jeopardy in the data collection practices and time constraints               
for institutions when dealing with beneficiaries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 See Param, P. B. (2016, May 31). Does financial inclusion really include?. The Hindu Businessline. Retrieved                 
February, 2017. 
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Chapter Four: Perspectives  
 
4.1 Outweighing Access Cost Benefits in a Financially Inclusive Ecosystem 
There are major benefits to an e-payment that outweigh its costs. As we discussed in the                
first chapter, the cost of currency operations are high in the country (See Figure 5). According to                 
a World Bank Development Report 2014 , it is studied that payment transactions through an              60
electronic mode will help save 1.6% of the country’s GDP, i.e save INR 1603.2 billion               61
(Kochhar 2014, 293). The report also discusses that individuals and small firms will benefit from               
using such mediums, easy online authorizations and efficient recording at low transactions costs             
improving transparency and accountability. However, in the case of India, the relationship            
between the access to finance and the cost of building relevant infrastructure, is complex. 
Figure 4 in Section 1.4 of Chapter One, illustrates the financially included consumers,             
with a low income, who face a lower monthly cost in terms of cash fees, than those individuals                  
without bank accounts. On the other hand, individuals with a high level of income, have easier                
access to payment accounts, but do not have cheap access to cash. Mazzotta B, Chakravorti B et.                 
al (2014) point out that the explanation for this is ‘willingness to pay for convenience’. The D2                 
individuals who did not possess a bank account, would pay a higher fee than everybody else                
except the A1 banked individuals. The authors suspect that this fee originates from the cost of                
borrowing, in order to access cash. The reason for a high fee to access cash, is because                 
low-income consumers do not have access to the formal banking system. Mentioned in a              
previous statistic in Section 2.2.2 (under Aadhaar), the 456 million people work in the              
60 World Bank, 2014. World Development Report  
61 Kochhar (2014) 
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unorganized sector, earning uncertain incomes (cash wages of a maximum of INR 25000 a year).               
If the unorganized sector is successfully integrated with the mainstream banking system, the 456              
million (85% of the population), it would drive down the cost of cash fees for transactions, based                 
on the argument above. 
As we know, India is cash intensive, and a number of factors like demographics: gender,               
age and employment status would affect each of these findings. The self-employed workers             
(single) who are provided with financial access, pay a lower access fee than other poor               
households with family workers and employers. “Men pay higher costs than do women on both a                
monthly basis and a per-transaction basis” according to a study conducted by the IMF (Das,               
Chandra et. al 2015). A second statistic shows that “Indian women are 8% less likely to own a                  
formal financial account and 12% likely to use digital services offered by these accounts”              
(Chatterjee, 2016). Moreover, women in rural areas tend to “save” currency by hiding it in tin                
cans and secret cabins, “away from the eyes of the men of the households” (Sharma, 2016).                
Moreover, this is more true for women living in low income households. 
The costs of e-payments combined with the infrastructure and connectivity concerns, will            
be a barrier to rise in adoption. Private sector investments are increasing and are beginning to be                 
engaged in setting up payments systems, enhancing data connectivity coverage in remote areas,             
and implementing cyber-security and associated infrastructure. As we saw in Section 3.2.1,            
smartphone adoption is rising at 2.53% per month, and wireline subscribers (landlines) are             
falling at a monthly rate of -0.16%. 
BCs as we know, will drive down transaction costs both for the demand and the supply                
side, because the ‘financial services value chain is getting disaggregated and newer specialised             
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participants are entering the landscape’ such as technology service providers (Kochhar 2014).            
Even after PMJDY was announced, and ordered to take care of ‘residual issues: inadequate              
remuneration to BCs, financial literacy, insurance linkages, amongst others, remain largely           
unaddressed’. (Kochhar 2014). 
The collaborative process of Microfinance institutions and the payment system has           
conceived a ‘less-cash’ model for self-help groups, providing members with a digital platform to              
expand their reach to government schemes such as the National Rural Livelihoods Mission             
(NRLM) and Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY), with a consistent underlying            
philosophy (that MFIs promoted from their inception), of driving greater financial inclusion.  
There are more opportunities in the MFI sector, after four (out of 22) MFIs received               
licenses to open Small Finance Banks (SFBs), who manage large portfolios of Small and              
Medium Enterprises, and the self-employed. To drive financial inclusion further, the country            
would benefit from digitizing more MFIs, while promoting a ‘less-cash’ ideology to help drive              
down the cost of currency operations (both demand and supply side), while bringing the assets of                
the unorganized sector, into the banking system.  
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4.2 Privacy Implications 
The emphasis placed on digital payments by the financial regulators was aggressive, and             
served as an ‘immediate provocation’ to recognize the currency shortage in the economic system              
(Ghosh, Chandrasekhar, Patnaik, 2017, 95). The government’s focus on cashless transactions           
also created a new source of ‘financial vulnerability’ among Indian citizens, and has forced              
individuals to ‘part with the meagre funds’ to improve the profitability of banks and financial               
technology companies, rendering them vulnerable to a loss of privacy and data theft (Ghosh,              
Chandrasekhar et. al. 2017, 102), compromising the digital identity of beneficiaries, without            
consent.  
In October, 2015, a Supreme Court order allowed the Aadhaar card to be used on a                
‘voluntary basis’ , and announced that no person will be deprived of financial benefits, based on               62
possession of the Aadhaar. After this, the government informed the Supreme court that a              
mechanism ‘exists under which a cardholder can choose to block the biometric information             
linked to his Aadhaar card’ . A successful mobile money service would be one that is able to                 63
track mobile transfer payments, and provision of robust login systems to meet regulatory             
demands.  
 
 
 
 
62Anand, U. (2015, October 16). Supreme Court allows Aadhaar card use on voluntary basis for government                
schemes. Retrieved February, 2017 
63Anand, U. (2015, October 15). Right to privacy concerns: Aadhaar holder can block his biometric info, Govt tells                  
Supreme Court. Retrieved February, 2017 
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4.3 Demonetization: A Boon or Bane to Financial Inclusion? 
The use of coercion (due to the physical absence of currency during demonetization), to              
‘nudge’ the Indian population into using electronic means of payment was not enough (Ghosh,              
Chandrasekhar et. al. 2017). Unfortunately after the ordinance, the rhetoric to mitigate cash a              
shortage through the incentive of transitioning to an e-payments system was a autonomous             
decision by the Prime Minister, and it carved the new nationalism road, that India is currently                
treading. The goal of eliminating black money, without knowledge of the size of the informal               
markets in India (varied statistics from The White Paper, The Wanchoo Committee, and the              
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy), made the removal of high denomination             
currency futile. The second futility in the ordinance was that “black money is not synonymous               
with corruption; it is rather one of the several symptoms of corruption” (See Chapter One). The                
emphasis laid by the RBI on achieving the primer financial inclusion goals, and of creating               
tailored solutions (high regional disparities), should have been the norm from the beginning.  
Demonetization was not necessary to begin the war on cash, given the liberalized             
commodity and trade markets, that consist of cash-heavy businesses. It was an unfair decision              
that caused significant damage to the Indian economy, and was unsuccessful in meeting its              
initial, declared goals of eliminating black money and terror financing. Although, its revised             
goals of going cashless, has delivered results of pushing digital payments. Moreover, the large              
scale exercise will not bring the informal economy and the unbanked to use digital platforms,               
overnight. The inclination toward using currency has been ingrained in the rural and urban poor,               
but the new utopia of e-payments is increasing through its convenience and affordable cost. The               
demonetization exercise indirectly helped in modifying the public’s financial well-being by           
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promoting digital payments, creating an integrated form of financial inclusion. Furthermore,           
declaring 85% of the nation’s currency without prior notice might have been the wrong step for                
the right reasons.  
The impact of Demonetization on digital payments, presented the market players of the             
payments ecosystem with opportunities. The dependent statistics to prove its success are mobile             
subscription growth (See Figure 13), the growing volume of digital payments, merchant            
willingness to accept non-cash models along with government incentives issued by the RBI. 
The Government of India and the RBI need to engage in delivering benefits of              
digital/digitizing payments, so that all of the country’s currency is under the banking radar. The               
roadblocks present, such as the jump from cash to mobile, can be overcome through government               
incentives, with the intention of lowering cost (both to the institution and the customer), by               
regulating the same, so that financial participants can benefit, such as the provision of a               
Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) while engaging in digital collections. Recently, the Press            
Information Bureau of the Government of India announced a ‘Package for the promotion of              
digital and cashless economy’ . It covers the cash benefits of transitioning to digital payments,              64
such as discounts on railway tickets, monthly and seasonal passes, and benefits to low-income              
railway personnel who would be able to avail services such as ‘catering, accommodation, retiring              
rooms’. Full inclusion can only be achieved if all cash gets into the banking system, and the                 
challenges of adopting such methods must be overcome in order to bank the unbanked.  
 
 
64 See Government of India, Press Information Bureau. (2016, December 8). Package for Promotion of Digital and                 
Cashless Economy [Press release]. Retrieved March, 2017. 
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Conclusion 
 Can we make the unbanked bankable? 
Digitization has certainly helped in routing transactions through the banking system,           
contrary to the cash that is outside the same. Money constitutes a liability of the banking                
ecosystem as we observed in chapter One (It is a ‘legal tender’ offered in the payment of debt).                  
‘Currency’ today, is the liability of the Reserve Bank of India, and other ‘non-currency’              
instruments are a liability of other banks (and BCs). A cheque payment simply transfers the               
claim upon a signature to the bank from the beneficiary’s name, to that of the cheque recipient. If                  
the beneficiary engages in a digital payment, it is identical to the act of transferring a claim held                  
by the beneficiary, to someone else’s name i.e the method of payment, regardless of being a                
cheque or a digitized payment. In order to receive credit from a bank, these institutions monitor                
the ‘creditworthiness’ of these individuals i.e he/she must be viewed as adequate earners, during              
the loan period in order to repay.  
In addition, the idle money stored in pillowcases and tin cans (See 2.1 and 4.1) become                
more accessible for individuals in low income households, which they may use at their              
disposition. Although currency loses its value over time due to inflation and high supply in the                
economic system, (See 1.1.2) the spread of banking and payment systems will assist in creating               
further cash flows and bringing all the money into the mainstream economy. Low cost digital               
payments are a vehicle to to collect the aforementioned idle money. 
The current infrastructure and policy objectives are favorable circumstances for more ad            
hoc micro-credit institutions, waiting to be granted licences to open more Small finance banks              
(SFBs) to carry forward financial inclusion in the country, by digitizing beneficiary information             
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through efficient bookkeeping practices. The positive impact following the long-term          
establishment of an efficient and extended financial sector will encourage economic growth and             
development in the country. 
A vast majority of the poor are not considered creditworthy because of their ambiguous              
economic activity. With regard to digital payments, it will be revolutionary in banking the              
unbanked, while creating micropayment opportunities for the poor, thus incentivizing savings,           
and in the long run, empowering the rural and urban poor. This, in turn, will allow for the                  
concerned groups to hold a credit history. The digital payments will, concomitant to the              
establishment of a credit history, help them maintain a stable income (with the assumption of               
self-employment or SME activities that produce income). This would push the weaker sections             
of Indian society to graduate to more formalised financial products, while maintaining their             
creditworthiness, succeeding in banking the unbanked, whilst making them ‘bankable’. 
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